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Colton Fehr*  Re-thinking the Process for Administering
	 Oaths	and	Affirmations
Courts around the world require witnesses to swear an oath to a religious deity or affirm 
to tell the truth before providing testimony. It is widely thought that such a process has 
the potential to give rise to unnecessary bias against witnesses based on their religious 
beliefs or lack thereof. Scholars have offered two main prescriptions to remedy this 
problem: (i) abolish the oath and have all witnesses promise to tell the truth; or (ii) 
require oath-swearing witnesses to invoke a non-specific reference to God. The former 
proposal is problematic as it rests on the unproven assertion that giving an oath does 
not bind at least some witnesses’ conscience to a greater extent. The latter fails to 
protect against bias towards atheists and other witnesses who refuse to swear an oath. 
The aim of this article is to develop an alternative procedure that allows witnesses to 
swear an oath or affirmation outside of the courtroom. This process not only rids the 
trial process of unnecessary bias, it also furthers the truth-seeking function of the trial 
process by allowing witnesses to bind their consciousness to a greater extent.
Les tribunaux du monde entier exigent des témoins qu’ils prêtent serment à une divinité 
religieuse ou qu’ils affirment solennellement de dire la vérité avant de témoigner. Il est 
largement admis qu’un tel processus peut donner lieu à des préjugés inutiles à l’encontre 
de certains témoins en raison de leurs croyances religieuses ou de l’absence de celles-
ci. Des chercheurs ont proposé deux solutions principales pour remédier à ce problème : 
(i) abolir le serment et faire en sorte que tous les témoins promettent solennellement de 
dire la vérité; ou (ii) exiger que les témoins qui prêtent serment invoquent une référence 
non spécifique à Dieu. La première proposition est problématique car elle repose 
sur l’affirmation non prouvée que le fait de prêter serment ne lie pas davantage la 
conscience d’au moins certains témoins. La seconde proposition ne protège pas contre 
les préjugés à l’égard des personnes athées et des autres témoins qui refusent de 
prêter serment. L’objectif du présent article est d’élaborer une procédure de rechange 
qui permettrait aux témoins de prêter serment ou de faire une affirmation solennelle 
en dehors de la salle d’audience. Cette procédure permettrait non seulement d’éviter 
toute partialité inutile, mais elle renforcerait également la fonction de recherche de la 
vérité du procès en permettant aux témoins de lier leur conscience dans une plus large 
mesure.
* Assistant Professor, Simon Fraser University, School of Criminology. The author wishes to 
thank Lucinda Vandervort, Steven Penney, and Isaac Mills for comments on previous drafts of this 
article.












The trial process typically requires that adult witnesses providing evidence 
swear an oath or affirmation to ensure the trier of fact that the evidence 
provided is truthful.1 Oaths involve swearing on a religious symbol such 
as the Christian Bible or the Islamic Quran.2 Affirmations do not involve 
religion. Instead, they require that the witness affirm that her evidence will 
be truthful.3 Oaths and affirmations typically are administered by the court 
clerk assisting the presiding judge. The oath or affirmation is generally 
given in front of the judge and, if applicable, the jury in charge of hearing 
the case before the court.
The growing literature on bias in the justice system has brought into 
question the ability of individual jurors to administer their duties without 
1. It is notable that there are exceptions for those who do not understand the nature of an oath 
or affirmation. These witnesses are typically allowed to promise to tell the truth, so long as they 
understand the importance of telling the truth. See Canada Evidence Act, RSC 1985, c C-5, s 16(3). 
Such a requirement does not require the witness to also understand the nature of a promise to tell the 
truth. See R v DAI, 2012 SCC 5 at paras 24-25. Child witnesses under the age of 14 are presumed 
to have the capacity to testify under section 16.1 of the Canada Evidence Act and are not required to 
swear an oath or affirmation unless their capacity to do so is affirmatively undermined.
2. See Canada Evidence Act, supra note 1, s 13; R v NS, 2012 SCC 72 at para 53.
3. See Canada Evidence Act, supra note 1, s 14.
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showing explicit or implicit bias towards minority groups.4 More recent 
scholarship has also shown that judges harbour implicit biases similar to 
those of lay people, and recent case law suggests that religious biases 
are also explicit in the judiciary.5 As such, it is questionable whether the 
first thing a judge or jury should know about a witness is her religious 
beliefs or lack thereof. This raises a question that has yet to be adequately 
addressed in the literature: can the process for administering oaths and 
affirmations be amended to rid the trial process of this potential for bias?  
Two main prescriptions have been offered to address this issue. First, 
scholars suggest that the oath and affirmation option be replaced with a 
requirement that all witnesses promise to tell the truth.6 Although this 
proposal would rid the trial process of the potential for bias, it also assumes 
that giving an oath does not bind at	least	some witnesses’ conscience to 
a greater extent. Second, scholars suggest that oath-swearing witnesses 
be required to invoke a non-specific reference to “God.”7 This proposal, 
however, fails to protect against potential biases towards atheists and other 
witnesses who refuse to swear an oath. 
The aim of this article is to develop an alternative procedure that 
preserves the current oath and affirmation structure while ensuring that bias 
does not enter the courtroom when swearing in witnesses. The proposal is 
simple: witnesses may swear an oath or provide an affirmation but must 
do so in front of the court clerk outside of the courtroom. The presiding 
judge may subsequently confirm the witness’ oath or affirmation. Such a 
procedure, I contend, not only ensures those whose consciences are more 
bound by providing an oath will continue to be permitted to swear an oath, 
it also rids the trial process of the unnecessary opportunity for bias.
The article unfolds in three parts. Part I provides an overview of the 
various rationales developed over time for allowing witnesses to choose 
4. This literature will be discussed in detail below.
5. Ibid.
6. See Thomas White, “Oaths in Judicial Proceedings and Their Effect upon the Competency of 
Witnesses” (1903) 51:7 American Law Regulations 373 at 444; Peter Nasmith, “High Time for One 
Secular ‘Oath’” (1990) 24 L Soc’y Gaz 230; David Tanovich, “J.(T.R.): Time to Remove Religion 
from the Oath” (2014) 6 CR (7th) 211 at 213; Jakob de Villiers, “Oath or Affirmation?  Or Neither?” 
(2009) 67:2 The Advocate 199; Sidney Lederman et al, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 5th ed 
(Toronto: Lexis Nexis Canada Inc, 2018) at 936; Justice Ted Matlow, “Let’s Swear off the Oath in 
Court,” The Globe and Mail (14 March 2000), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/
lets-swear-off-the-oath-in-court/article766477/> [https://perma.cc/SYL2-BU95]. For a more recent 
defence of the option to provide an oath or affirmation, see Myron Gochnauer, “Oaths, Witnesses and 
Modern Law” (1991) 4:3 Can JL & Jur 67 at 98-100; Michael Bennett, “The Right of the Oath” (1995) 
17:1 Advocate Q 40; Michael Bennett, “No Time to Swear?” (1997) 19:4 Advocate Q 444.
7. See Eugene R Milhizer “So Help Me Allah: An Historical and Prudential Analysis of Oaths as 
Applied to the Current Controversy of the Bible and Quran in Oath Practices in America” (2009) 70:1 
Ohio St LJ 1 at 70.
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between swearing an oath or affirmation. Part II then reviews the available 
literature on bias towards religious minorities, with specific attention to the 
actors whose bias is most likely to be affected by administering oaths and 
affirmations: jurors and judges. Part III concludes by problematizing the 
in-court procedure for administering oaths and affirmations. In so doing, 
I reject the popular proposals advocating for the abolition or modification 
of the oath and instead develop a principled and efficient procedure for 
administering oaths and affirmations outside of the courtroom.
I. Oaths	and	affirmations
In the Western legal tradition, witnesses were required to swear an oath 
to the Christian God before being declared competent as a witness.8 This 
practice began to change in the mid-eighteenth century with the House 
of Lord’s decision in Omychund	 v	 Barker.9 The Court affirmed that 
witnesses may swear oaths to other religious entities so long as retribution 
followed breaking the oath. As Chief Justice Willes observed, limiting the 
oath to Christians “is contrary to religion, common sense, and common 
humanity.”10 As he explained, “it would be absurd for [a non-Christian] 
to swear according to the Christian oath, which he does not believe; and 
therefore, out of necessity, he must be allowed to swear according to his 
own notion of an oath.”11
The Court in Omychund nevertheless concluded that competency to 
give evidence required some religious binding of the conscience. This in 
effect excluded the possibility of witnesses taking an affirmation.12 As a 
result, atheists were prohibited from testifying in courts, as were those 
whose religious beliefs—most notably Quakers13 and Mennonites14—
prevented them from swearing an oath.15 Other cultural oaths which bind 
the conscience were also prohibited. For instance, Chinese witnesses who 
used alternative oath-swearing ceremonies—including the saucer oath,16 
8. See White, supra note 6 at 386-387.
9. Omychund	v	Barker, (1744), 1 ATK 21, 26 ER 15 (HL) [Omychund].
10. Ibid at 30.
11. Ibid at 31.
12. Ibid. See also Attorney General v Bradlaugh (1885), 14 QBD 667 (CA); R	v	Tuck (1912), 2 
WWR 605, 5 DLR 629 (ABCA) [Tuck].
13. See “Quakers” (3 June 2009), online: BBC: Religions <https://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/
christianity/subdivisions/quakers_1.shtml> [https://perma.cc/27RN-YL73].
14. See Mennonite Church of Canada, “Confession of Faith—Article 20: Truth and the Avoidance of 
Oaths” (2019), online: Mennonite Church of Canada <http://home.mennonitechurch.ca/cof> [https://
perma.cc/QN7H-JMSC]. 
15. See Tuck,	supra note 12; Bell v Bell (1899), 34 NBR 615 (NBCA); R v Brasier (1779), 1 Leach 
199, 168 ER 202 (CA (Crim Div)).
16. The saucer oath requires the witness to kneel in front of the witness box, smash a China saucer, 
and swear that her soul would be cracked like the saucer if they did not tell the truth. See Provincial 
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paper oath,17 and, on more serious occasions, the chicken oath18—were 
prohibited from testifying in court based on this ruling.19
This insistence upon requiring a religious oath rested on its increased 
importance to the oath-taker. Although lying is generally viewed as an 
immoral act, lying under oath is thought to be a particularly serious 
transgression.20 As Thomas White observes, “[e]ach ceremony of oath 
taking involves an expressed or implied imprecation of the vengeance of 
the being invoked.”21 Taking an oath will therefore result in persons being 
“more firmly engaged to tell the truth…by the just awe and dread of the 
Divinity.”22 As White concludes, “[i]n its essential features therefore the 
oath is a religious ceremony which is thought to impose upon the swearer 
an added obligation to tell the truth, in that if he violate[s] his oath he will 
suffer divine punishment greater than that which he would have suffered 
had he told an untruth when unsworn.”23
The emphasis on oath swearing has subsequently become less 
prominent.24 As a result, Christian groups who believed swearing an oath 
is prohibited by religious text were eventually given the right to affirm.25 
A similar right was also given to atheists, although they would not receive 
the right in England until the mid-nineteenth century.26 As John Stuart Mill 
observed, there was an inherent unfairness in excluding non-believers from 
testifying in court.27 In effect, those who were truthful enough to admit 
their lack of faith were prohibited from being witnesses while those who 
Court of British Columbia, “Oaths and Alternatives, Past and Present, in BC Courts” (27 November 
2018), online: Provincial	 Court	 of	 British	 Columbia	 <https://www.provincialcourt.bc.ca/enews/
enews-27-11-2018> [https://perma.cc/U9E6-DP9T].
17. The paper oath requires the witness to sign her name on a piece of paper, burn the paper, and 
swear that her soul would be consumed by fire if she did not tell the truth. See PS Lampman, “The 
Chinese Oath” (1904) 3:1 Can L Rev 24.
18. The chicken oath requires the witness to recite an oath, following which she would decapitate 
a chicken, and then burn the paper on which the oath was written. For a description of each of these 
three forms of oath and their relative importance see ibid. For instances of these forms of oaths being 
discussed and utilized, see R v Wooey, 8 CCC 25, [1902] BCJ No 89 (BCSC); R	v	Entrehman	(1842), 
174 ER 493 (NP); R v Ping, 8 CCC 467, [1904] BCJ No 12 (BCCA).
19. This follows based on the rationale outlined in Omychund,	supra note 9. 
20. See White, supra note 6 at 378, n 9. 
21. Ibid at 378.
22. Ibid at 414. White cites several other academic works and judicial rulings for a similar proposition 
at 414-415.
23. Ibid at 415 [emphasis added]. 
24. Witnesses were in fact allowed to swear an oath or affirmation in Canada’s first law dealing with 
evidence. See Canada	Evidence	Act,	1893, SC 1893, c 31, s 23.
25. See Hamish Stewart et al, Evidence:	 A	 Canadian	 Casebook, 4th ed (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery, 2016) at 29. The right came via legislation. See also White, supra note 6 at 420-421 
citing (1688), I Wm & Mary, c 18, s 13; (1696), 7 & 8 Wm & Mary, c 34, s 1; (1721), 8 Geo I, C 6.
26. See Evidence	Further	Amendment	Act,	1869	(UK), 32 & 33 Vict c 68, s 4.
27. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), Chapter 2.
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lied about their faith were permitted to testify.28 This rationale was slowly 
accepted by various legislatures across the Commonwealth leading to the 
now-common policy of allowing witnesses to swear an oath or provide an 
affirmation before testifying in court.29
II.	 Bias	in	the	judicial	system
Despite judicial systems allowing witnesses to swear an oath or affirmation 
for well over a century, empirical studies on the potential for triers 
of fact to be biased by exposure to witnesses’ religious beliefs or lack 
thereof have been relatively scant. As the following review will illustrate, 
however, there is good reason to believe that such knowledge could have 
a significant impact on the fairness of the trial process. 
1. Jurors
Although there are no known studies that consider whether religious 
groups tend to believe other religious groups to a greater or lesser extent, 
recent studies have begun to test whether individual biases exist towards 
atheists. In Canada, thirty-one per cent of people recently agreed with the 
statement that “[i]t is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral.”30 
That number was higher in the United States, at fifty-three per cent.31 In 
Europe, thirty-three and twenty-seven per cent of respondents in Germany 
and Italy, respectively, demonstrated an anti-atheist bias.32 Responses 
were lower in Britain and France, where twenty and fifteen per cent of 
respondents confirmed a bias against atheists.33
A more recent study representing over 3,000 participants from 13 
different countries drew similar conclusions.34 The study considered 
opinion responses to several egregious crimes, including a fact pattern 
involving the murder of several homeless people.35 People were more 
28. See ibid.
29. See White, supra note 6 at 393-396.
30. Pew Research Centre, “Worldwide, Many see Belief in God as Essential to Morality” (13 March 
2014), online: Pew Research Centre <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2014/03/13/worldwide-
many-see-belief-in-god-as-essential-to-morality/> [https://perma.cc/9C8J-NHEH] [Pew Research 
Centre, “Worldwide”]. It is notable that this number is up one per cent from seven years earlier. See 
Pew Research Centre, “Views of Religion and Morality” (4 October 2007), online: Pew Research 
Center <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2007/10/04/chapter-3-views-of-religion-and-morality/> 
[https://perma.cc/5C4U-S94L]. 
31. See Pew Research Centre,	“Worldwide,” supra note 30. This number is down four per cent from 
seven years earlier.
32. Ibid. Compared to a previous study from seven years earlier, the number of Germans answering 
in the affirmative to this question is down six per cent while the number in Italy is up three per cent.
33. Ibid. Both countries’ answers to these questions are down two per cent from seven years earlier.
34. See Will M Gervais et al, “Global Evidence of Extreme Intuitive Moral Prejudice Against 
Atheists” (2017) 1 Nature Human Behaviour 1.
35. Ibid at 2.
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than twice as likely to believe that such extreme immorality would be 
committed by an atheist than by a believer.36 Interestingly, this bias was 
consistent among both “high” and “low” believers.37 Although to a lesser 
extent, even atheists believed that other atheists were more likely than 
religious people to commit such crimes.38 Only slightly lower degrees of 
bias towards atheists were observed where the crime committed—failing to 
pay a restaurant bill—was less serious.39 As the authors conclude, “across 
the world, religious belief is intuitively viewed as a necessary safeguard 
against the temptations of grossly immoral conduct.”40  
Although there is no literature on whether religious beliefs influence 
the juror deliberation process in Canada, American literature has found 
that religious beliefs have the potential to significantly affect juror 
verdicts.41 As Brian Bornstein and Monica Miller observe in their book 
God	in	the	Courtroom:	Religion’s	Role	at	Trial, there is legitimate concern 
that “jurors may mention their religious beliefs, cite scripture during 
deliberation, pray, or consult with pastors.”42 As the authors observe, there 
are many instances of such religious behaviour known to have occurred in 
American jury deliberation rooms.43 The quantity of decisions on this point 




40. Ibid. For studies exploring how different reasoning processes of religious and non-religious 
people might explain the bias of religious persons towards atheists, see Gordon Pennycook et al, 
“Belief Bias During Reasoning among Religious Believers and Skeptics” (2013) 20:4 Psychonomic 
Bull Rev 806; Will M Gervais & Ara Norenzayan, “Analytic Thinking Promotes Religious Disbelief” 
(2012) 336 Science 493; Gordon Pennycook et al, “Analytic Cognitive Style Predicts Religious and 
Para-Normal Belief” (2012) 123:3 Cognition 335; Amitai Shenhav, David G Rand & Joshua D Greene, 
“Divine Intuition: Cognitive Style Influences Belief in God” (2012) 141:3 J Experimental Psychology 
423.
41. For an excellent review of the American case law and literature, see Brian Bornstein & Monica 
Miller, God	in	the	Courtroom:	Religion’s	Role	at	Trial (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 
67-81.
42. Ibid at 67-76. For instances of use of the Bible in jury deliberations, the authors cite Oliver v 
Quarterman, 541 F 3d 329 (5th Circ, 2008); Lucero v Texas, 246 SW 3d 86 (Tex Crim App, 2008).
43. Bornstein & Miller, supra note 41 at 71-75, citing among other American cases: State	v	Demille, 
756 P2d 81 (Utah, 1988) (juror admitted to voting guilty because God had not answered the juror’s 
prayer and sent the juror a “sign” the defendant was innocent); State	v	Williams, 832 NE 2d 783 (Ohio, 
2005); Holladay v State, 629 SO 2d 673 (Alabama, 1992) (the fact that the jury prayed together shortly 
before deciding to sentence the defendant to death was not a sign of jury bias); People v Harlan, 
109 P3d 616 (Colorado, 2005), leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States refused 
(juror quoted, among other verses, Leviticus 24:20-21, which provides “[b]reach for breach; eye for 
eye, tooth for tooth: as he has caused a blemish in a man, so shall it be done to him again. And he 
that killeth a beast he shall restore it: and he that killeth a man, he shall be put to death.” The Court 
overturned the imposition of the death penalty as a result of reading this verse); People	v	Williams, 148 
P3d 47 (California, 2006) (the Court found at 80 that reading Bible verses to the jury which “merely 
counseled deference to governmental authority and affirmed validity of sitting in judgment of one’s 
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in a comparable country44 is serious cause for concern. Unfortunately, we 
may never know the extent to which this practice occurs in Canada given 
that jurors are strictly prohibited from discussing jury deliberations.45
2. Judges
Bias is also discernible in the Canadian jurisprudence regarding the 
process of taking an oath or affirmation. In R v J(TR), the Crown invited 
the trial judge to conclude that “for a religious individual to affirm instead 
of swearing on the Bible leads to an inference that he was not telling the 
truth.”46 The judge responded: “I do not view the accused’s choice to affirm 
as raising a significant concern respecting his credibility….However it is 
a factor to be considered in assessing his evidence.”47 Although on appeal 
this rationale was found to be inconsistent with the plain wording of 
section 14 of the Canada Evidence Act,48 the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal nevertheless held that “there may be factual circumstances where 
it could be appropriate for a judge to permit some exploration of the issue 
fellow human beings according to law” did not bias the jury’s decision to impose the death sentence); 
People	v	Danks, 82 P3d 1249 (California, 2004) (juror shared several Bible verses to comfort those 
who were having reservations about imposing the death penalty. The Court determined that it was 
unlikely that this swayed the jurors. A juror had also sought guidance about the specific case from 
her pastor, who told her the scripture allowing the death penalty were “good scriptures” and that the 
defendant should be executed. Although this was found to be “misconduct” it was not sufficient to 
overturn the imposition of the death penalty); Fields v Brown, 503 F3d 755 (9th Circuit, 2007) (juror 
read passages from the Bible that were “for” and “against” the death penalty. This was insufficient to 
overturn the imposition of the death penalty); Young v State, 12 P3d 20 (Oklahoma, 2000) (the fact that 
jurors had discussed their religious beliefs during trial was not enough to require a new trial); People v 
Lewis, 28 P3d 34 (California, 2001) (In response to a juror hesitating to impose the death penalty, the 
foreman stated “he did not know if it would help her, but what had helped him make his decision was 
that [the defendant] had been exposed to Jesus Christ and if that was in fact true [the defendant] would 
have ‘everlasting life’ regardless of what happened to him.” The Court at 71 did not find this statement 
to be inappropriate and affirmed the death penalty).
44. See James Stribopoulos, “Lessons from the Pupil: A Canadian Solution to the American 
Exclusionary Rule” (1999) 22:1 Boston College Intl & Comp L Rev 77 at 81-82: “For comparative 
purposes, Canada is unlike any other Common-wealth nation. Canada and the United States share 
close geographic proximity, similar cultures, and a common language. Both nations have ethnically 
diverse populations forged from immigrant citizens who predominately reside in concentrated urban 
areas. Both nations have prospered throughout the post-war era and share similar levels of economic 
development. Although differences definitely exist, it is arguable that no two nations share so many 
similarities.” See also Luc Turgeon, “Introduction” in Luc Turgeon et al, eds, Comparing	Canada:	
Methods and Perspectives on Canadian Politics (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014) 3 at 13.
45. There is a common law jury secrecy rule. This rule, as well as section 649 of the Criminal	Code	
of Canada, RSC 1985, c C-46, which makes it an offence for a juror to disclose “any information 
relating to the proceedings of the jury when it was absent from the courtroom” subject to very limited 
exceptions, were upheld as consistent with the Charter in R v Pan; R v Sawyer, 2001 SCC 42. 
46. R v J(TR), 2013 BCCA 449 at para 5 [J(TR)].
47. Ibid at para 6 [emphasis added].
48. Supra note 1 Section 14(2) reads “[w]here a person makes a solemn affirmation in accordance 
with subsection (1), his evidence shall be taken and have the same effect as if taken under oath.”
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of the degree to which an oath or affirmation may bind the conscience of 
a witness.”49 
In R v K(AH), an adverse inference was drawn against a Muslim 
witness because the witness chose to swear on the Bible as opposed to 
the Quran.50 Likewise, in R v Bell, a central witness for the Crown who 
happened to be Muslim had an adverse inference drawn against him for 
swearing an oath on the Bible.51 A similar argument was made in R v 
Daud because the witness, who identified as a Sunni Muslim, chose to 
provide an affirmation instead of swearing an oath on the Quran.52 Despite 
a variety of reasons why a Muslim witness might decide to swear an oath 
on the Bible or affirm,53 courts and counsel are willing to draw an explicit 
adverse inference against witnesses who swear on the Quran.  
It is also possible that judges will provide too much weight to a witness’ 
choice to swear an oath. In R v Ali, for instance, the judge stated that the 
witness “was one of the most intelligent, sincere and believable witnesses 
that has ever testified before me. Clutching her copy of the Koran she 
swore to tell the truth. That oath bound her conscience in a way that came 
out in Court loud and clear.”54 As for the defendant, the judge continued, 
“his mild manner and denials were an attempt to camouflage his true 
self.”55 As opposed to reasoning through both sides of the evidence, the 
judge appears to have relied heavily on the effect swearing on the Quran 
had on the witness’ credibility.56 As Canadian judges have shown explicit 
bias in their written judgments, it is likely that this type of bias infiltrates 
many other trials given the relative infrequency within which the process 
for administering oaths and affirmations is litigated.
49. J(TR),	supra note 46 at para 4.
50. R v K(AH), 2011 ONSC 5510 at paras 27-28.
51. R v Bell, 2011 ONSC 1218 at para 57.
52. R v Daud, 2007 BCPC 68 at para 12.
53. As Tanovich, supra note 6 observes at 212-213: “the witness may be unfamiliar with the 
difference between the two methods or may not even understand what affirm means. In addition, 
different religions may have different views about the oath and about swearing to God in a public 
place like the courtroom. Similarly, a Muslim witness may choose to swear on the Bible instead of 
the Koran because the witness may not want it known that he or she is Muslim because of a concern 
about stereotyping. Or, they may believe that the Bible is simply a universal courtroom symbol of 
the oath to God or that it is the standard practice. Alternatively, the witness may be unaware of the 
availability of another religious book or practice that could be used. More fundamentally, assumptions 
about religions may simply be uninformed. So, for example, according to Islamic teaching, Jesus is 
a Prophet of God. Therefore, some Muslim witnesses may feel their conscience religiously bound by 
swearing an oath on the Bible.”
54. R v Ali, 2012 SKPC at para 8.
55. Ibid.
56. The judge does not attempt to explain why the evidence of the husband was non-credible.
646 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Although general studies on explicit religious bias in Canadian 
courts do not exist, it is notable that American judges have been found 
to exhibit significant bias in their decision-making.57 One judge, by his 
own admission, gave approximately 1500 defendants the choice between 
going to jail or attending church for a specified period of time.58 The 
judge was not alone in this practice.59 Others have relied on apparent 
Biblical prohibitions on homosexuality to justify highly discriminatory 
decisions.60 More generally, judges frequently invoke religious text to 
justify sentencing decisions. As one study concluded with respect to the 
permissibility of using religious texts for sentencing purposes: “[r]eligious 
texts are allowed to provide a reason for sentencing, as long as they do not 
provide the sole reason, and the latter is virtually impossible to prove.”61 
Although the above accounts expose various forms of explicit bias, 
researchers have also sought to determine to what extent judges harbour 
implicit biases.62 The latter type of bias arises in most people, resulting in 
subtle stereotypes unknown to the subject biasing their decisions.63 Such 
bias often arises even in those who actively embrace non-discrimination 
norms.64 To test for implicit bias, study participants often take what is 
known as the Implicit Association Test (IAT). This test typically requires 
participants to categorize words and faces over two distinct phases.65 In 
the first phase, participants are shown words or pictures on a screen and 
are told to respond by pushing a button indicating “white/good” or “black/
bad.”66 In the second phase, the categories are switched to “white/bad” 
and “black/good.”67 The latency between response times is then used to 
measure the subject’s implicit bias score.68
57. See Bornstein & Miller, supra note 41 at 105-110.
58. Ibid at 107 citing David Barringer, “Higher Authorities: Religious Faith Ordinarily is a Personal 
Matter” (1996) 82:12 ABA J 68 at 71.
59. Bornstein & Miller, supra note 41 citing “Judge Gives Offenders Option of Church,” Boston 
Globe (31 May 2005).
60. See Ex Parte HH, 830 So 2d 21 (Alabama, 2002) where a judge ruled against a lesbian mother in 
a custody dispute on the basis, in part, of a prohibition against homosexuality found in Leviticus 20:13.
61. See Bornstein & Miller, supra note 41 at 109 citing Lis Wiehl, “Judges and Lawyers are not 
Singing from the Same Hymnal When it comes to Allowing the Bible in the Courtroom” (2000) 24:2 
Am J Trial Advoc 273.
62. See e.g. Jeffrey Rachlinski et al, “Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?” (2009) 
84:3 Notre Dame L Rev 1195.
63. Ibid at 1197 citing Jerry Kang & Mahzarin Banaji, “Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist 
Revision of ‘Affirmative Action’” (2006) 94:4 Cal L Rev 1063 at 1065. 
64. Rachlinski et al, supra note 62 at 1197.
65. Ibid at 1198.
66. Ibid at 1198-1199.
67. Ibid at 1199.
68. Ibid. For a detailed description and defence of the IAT vis-à-vis criticisms of the test, see ibid at 
1198-1201.
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, the relative novelty of implicit bias studies 
being applied to the judiciary has resulted in a focus on race relations.69 
One such study, however, has touched on judicial bias towards religious 
groups.70 That study applied the IAT to 239 sitting American judges to 
determine whether they discriminated against so-called “privileged 
minorities” such as Asian-Americans and Jewish-Americans.71 The study 
found that American judges harbour strong to intermediate bias against 
these groups while holding favourable stereotypes towards Whites 
and, important for present purposes, Christians.72 Judges were found to 
associate negative stereotypes such as being “greedy,” “dishonest,” and 
“controlling” with Asian- and Jewish-Americans, while Whites and 
Christians were associated with positive traits such as being “trustworthy,” 
“honest,” and “giving.”73 The study also found that judges’ pro-Christian 
implicit stereotypes often result in shorter sentences for Christian offenders 
as compared to Jewish offenders who committed a similar offence.74 
As I observed at the outset, the available literature on bias towards 
religious and non-religious persons in the legal context is still developing. 
The results from the American studies cited above, in addition to the more 
explicit bias found in the Canadian jurisprudence, nevertheless suggest 
that bias against a person’s religious beliefs may very well impact trial 
fairness. The fact that the empirical research is incomplete does not, 
however, prevent further thinking on legal policy reform. Indeed, as the 
next section of this article illustrates, legal scholars have already begun to 
set out prescriptions for dealing with the potential for bias to arise from the 
administration of oaths and affirmations in the courtroom.
III. Prescriptions
Scholars have made two main proposals to prevent bias towards religious 
and non-religious groups from entering the trial process through the 
oath and affirmation process. First, it has been suggested that the oath be 
abolished. In its place, all witnesses would be required to affirm/promise 
to tell the truth. Second, those who would preserve oath-taking suggest 
that witnesses be allowed to make a non-specific reference to “God” when 
69. See Justin Levenson, Mark Bennett & Koichi Hioki, “Judging Implicit Bias: A National 
Empirical Study of Judicial Stereotypes” (2017) 69:1 Fla L Rev 63 at 68, n 12 reviewing the available 
literature. The authors further observe that testing for implicit bias in the judiciary has only been 
studied once before the present study, namely, in Rachlinski et al, supra note 62.
70. Levenson, Bennett & Hioki, supra note 69.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid at 68-69, 104, 107, 109-110.
73. Ibid at 69.
74. Ibid.
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swearing an oath. As I contend below, each proposal is problematic. As 
such, it is necessary to explore alternative methods for administering oaths 
and affirmations.
1.  Abolish oaths
A variety of scholars are in favour of abolishing the oath. In its place, they 
suggest that witnesses simply promise to tell the truth and be reminded 
that there are severe legal consequences which result from lying in court.75 
This proposal is not without merit. Its main benefit is that it prevents the 
judge or jury from knowing the witness’ religious beliefs or lack thereof. 
If it is true, however, that some religious witnesses are more	likely to tell 
the truth based on giving an oath, then abandoning the oath will also result 
in some difficult-to-quantify negative effect on the trial process’ ability to 
get at the truth of the matter.
It may be retorted that there is a lack of evidence to support the view 
that religious persons view breaking an oath as bringing about divine 
punishment.76 Historically, it is certainly true that religious persons held 
such a view. As the English Common Law Commission observed: 
It can, we hardly think, be doubted that there is a large class of persons 
who though less alive than they ought to be to a sense of moral duty or 
to the fear of legal penalties, yet may be deterred from falsehood when 
to these is added the dread of divine vengeance. Moreover, we think it 
cannot be doubted that the effect of a transition from the use of judicial 
oaths to simple declaration would, at least at the outset, by removing 
one of the barriers to falsehood, encourage false testimony and tend 
materially to lessen the confidence of the public in the administration 
of justice.77 
In a Law Reform Commission of Canada Report considering the merits 
of oath-taking, Commissioner La Forest (as he then was) decided against 
recommending abolition of the oath for similar reasons:
I am convinced that a substantial number of people are more likely to 
tell the truth, at least the whole truth, if they take the oath. To those who 
take the oath seriously (and this covers a great many people) the certain 
demands of conscience are more likely to elicit the exact truth than the 
75. See supra note 6. Although not all of these authors use this language (I borrow this proposal 
explicitly from Tanovich, supra note 6 and Nasmith, supra note 6), it provides a reasonable summary 
of the general proposal.
76. See R v B(KG), [1993] 1 SCR 740 at paras 86-87, 79 CCC (3d) 257; R v Fletcher, 1 CCC (3d) 
370 at 377, [1982] OJ No 153 (ONCA) leave to appeal refused (1983) 48 NR 319 (SCC).
77. See White, supra note 6 at 431 citing the English Common Law Commission, 2nd Report (1853) 
at 14.
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highly uncertain threat of a prosecution for perjury.78 
Although the oath may have lost some of its significance among religious 
circles, the oath has since time immemorial provided a means for better 
ensuring the truthfulness of a statement.79 Given this historical record, I 
take the view that the status quo should not be discarded without strong 
empirical evidence to the contrary.80
It may also be argued that preserving the oath requirement because of 
its potential to make religious witnesses more likely to tell the truth relies 
on circuitous reasoning. As White observed, any religious witness who is 
subpoenaed to testify, and who intends on lying, might choose to affirm 
thereby avoiding violating the oath and enduring divine punishment.81 As 
oaths and affirmations are equal in the eyes of the law,82 the oath will not 
have its intended effect as there is no way of requiring the witness to swear 
an oath to her God. Preserving the ability for religious witnesses to swear 
an oath would therefore not make the received evidence any more likely 
to be truthful. 
This argument does, however, operate on two key assumptions. First, 
it assumes that those who intend to lie will also be willing to publicly 
proclaim that they do not want to swear an oath to their God. Observers 
known to the accused may very well view such a decision as an affront 
to the witness’ religion.83 Second, the argument assumes that witnesses 
will always have made up their mind to tell a lie before taking the witness 
stand. If the witness is religious and did not take the stand intending to 
lie, then there is no reason for the witness not to take an oath. In such 
circumstances, the oath would still place greater weight on the witness to 
tell the truth in court proceedings.
2. Neutralize oaths
Eugene Milhizer suggests that it would be prudent to modify the oath to 
allow religious witnesses to swear an oath only via a non-specific reference 
to “God.”84 In an increasingly pluralistic society, this proposal avoids the 
necessity of determining which types of religions “count” for the purposes 
of swearing an oath.85 It also avoids having to determine which religious 
78. See Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report on Evidence (1975) at 87.
79. See generally Milhizer, supra note 7.
80. The authors who would abolish the oath have not provided any empirical evidence proving that 
the oath has no significance to religious persons (supra note 6).
81. See White, supra note 6 at 433.
82. See Canada Evidence Act, supra note 1, s 14.
83. It is unclear in the literature whether religious groups require witnesses to swear an oath.
84. See Milhizer, supra note 7 at 3.
85. Ibid at 69.
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artifacts ought to be permitted to be sworn upon.86 Allowing courts to 
perform this task is arguably problematic as courts do not “have any special 
competence in rendering judgments about the legitimacy of religions and 
religious beliefs.”87 In Milhizer’s view, “[t]o ensnare secular lawmakers or 
judges in these confounding matters would be more than wasteful: it could 
be highly inappropriate, disrespectful, and even sacrilegious.”88 
Although these concerns are legitimate, Milhizer does not provide any 
examples of this problem arising in practice. This is likely because courts 
have approached the oath and affirmation process liberally. As the process 
of oath-swearing is conducted at a preliminary stage of court proceedings, 
courts have little to gain by restricting the means by which a witness swears 
an oath. Barring allowance of a particular type of oath somehow infringing 
upon the rights of some other trial participant—a hypothetical scenario 
which is difficult to imagine—courts are likely to avoid confrontation and 
allow witnesses to swear an oath that is meaningful to them.
More obviously, Milhizer’s proposal is unpersuasive because it does 
not address the potential for bias against a particular type of witnesses: 
non-oath-swearing witnesses. The fact that a witness will not swear to a 
God strongly implies that the witness is an atheist. As the above review 
suggests, atheists are less likely to be believed by the trier of fact. Although 
it is possible that some jurors and judges might attribute choosing to 
provide an affirmation to the witness belonging to a minority non-oath-
swearing religious community,89 it is unlikely the vast majority of triers 
of fact would know this nuanced theological fact let alone make such 
an assumption about every witness who testifies before them. As such, 
it is reasonable to believe that maintaining the distinction between oaths 
(“neutralized” or not) and affirmations in the courtroom will likely bias at 
least some trials. 
3.	 External	administration
As the current proposals are problematic, it must be asked whether there 
are alternative means to preserve the current choice for swearing an oath 
or affirmation without potentially biasing the trial process. To accomplish 
these ends, I suggest that witnesses be permitted to swear an oath of 
their choice or provide an affirmation but be required to do so in front 




89. Recall that Quakers and Mennonites believe swearing an oath is contrary to their religion (see 
supra notes 13-14).
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affirmation process would be administered out of view from judge and 
jury. The witness’ choice may then be confirmed by the presiding judge 
before the witness testifies in court. The judge may do so by simply asking 
witnesses to confirm that they swore an oath or affirmation to tell the truth 
in the courtroom. Upon so confirming, witnesses would then proceed to 
provide their testimony.
This process has four main benefits. First, and most obviously, the 
proposal removes knowledge about witnesses’ religious beliefs from 
the trial process. As a result, defendants will be more likely to have a 
fair trial and the Crown will be better able to pursue convictions without 
interference of bias. To be sure, this proposal by no means guarantees that 
bias towards witnesses’ beliefs will be removed from the judicial process. 
Their religious beliefs may still be surmised by the nature of their dress, 
accent, or other indicia, or in some instances if their religious beliefs form 
part of their testimony. Nevertheless, the proposal here still represents a 
means for removing unnecessary potential for bias in many other cases. 
Second, my proposal would also be more efficient. Currently, the 
judge, jury, court clerk, and both sides’ lawyers are required to sit through 
the administration of all oaths and affirmations. If the court clerk affirmed 
to the court and parties’ lawyers that “all witnesses appearing in court today 
have been sworn or affirmed to tell the truth” the administration of the 
oath in court would become unnecessary. If it were deemed preferable for 
witnesses to confirm their oaths or affirmations publicly, witnesses could 
simply be asked if they “reaffirm the sworn oath or solemn affirmation to 
tell the truth in this court provided to the court clerk.” By answering only 
“yes” or “no,” the oath and affirmation process would be shortened for the 
judges and lawyers involved: the more costly parties to the administration 
of justice.
This proposal would be especially efficient when accommodating 
those who wish to swear more time-consuming oaths.90 This problem 
has been viewed as pressing enough to convince some legislatures of the 
need to prevent certain witnesses from swearing their chosen oath during 
regular court proceedings. For instance, the British	Columbia	Evidence	Act	
provides that if “it is not reasonably practicable without inconvenience or 
delay to administer an oath to a person in the form or manner appropriate 
to the person’s religious beliefs, the person must, despite any other 
enactment or law, make a solemn affirmation in the prescribed form.”91 
90. The chicken oath provides one example (see supra note 18).
91. RSBC 1996, c 124, s 20(3). 
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Such an amendment would be significantly less necessary if the process 
did not need to be overseen by all parties in the trial process.
 Third, allowing witnesses to swear an oath is consistent with 
Canada’s commitment to multicultural values. Accommodating diversity 
of religious belief is a necessary tenet of multiculturalism. As the Court 
observed in R v NS, “[a] secular response that requires witnesses to park 
their religion at the courtroom door is inconsistent with the jurisprudence 
and Canadian tradition.”92 The Court continues, “[t]he long-standing 
practice in Canadian courts is to respect and accommodate the religious 
convictions of witnesses, unless they pose a significant or serious risk to a 
fair trial.”93 Where allowing citizens to express their religious beliefs serves 
at worst as an inconvenience—as would be the case under my proposed 
external administration procedure—religious toleration therefore dictates 
allowing a religious practice to continue. 
It may be countered, however, that both the current procedure 
(and presumably the proposed external administration procedure) 
unconstitutionally compels a person to communicate their religious views 
contrary to section 2(a) of the Charter.94  The argument is straightforward: 
by telling witnesses of the option to swear a religious oath, any witness who 
chooses to provide an affirmation will be compelled to implicitly admit 
they are an atheist. Similarly, if a witness chooses to swear on a holy book, 
this action will communicate something about a witness’ religious beliefs. 
Either way, a witness is compelled to say something	about her religion or 
conscience.95 A witness’ refusal to be so compelled in turn compromises 
her ability to testify and thus her right to make fair answer and defence and 
her right to a fair trial.96
Two courts have considered whether the oath and affirmation 
procedure violates section 2(a) of the Charter.97 This right provides that 
government may not, in purpose or effect, “coerce individuals to affirm 
a specific religious belief or to manifest a specific religious practice for 
a sectarian purpose.”98 Each of the aforementioned decisions found that 
the oath and affirmation option was consistent with section 2(a) of the 
92. NS, supra note 2 at para 2. With respect to the important role the oath has played in particular, 
see para 53.
93. Ibid at para 2.
94. See R v Anderson, [2001] 7 WWR 582, 85 CRR (2d) 107 (MBPC) [Anderson]; R v Robinson 
(2004), 181 Man R (2d) 75 (MBPC) [Robinson,	MBPC], aff’d 2005 MBQB 50 leave to appeal refused 
2005 MBCA 69. 
95. See Anderson, supra note 94 at para 6. 
96. Ibid at paras 11-12. See also Robinson,	MBPC, supra note 94 at paras 2, 8.
97. See Anderson, supra note 94 and Robinson,	MBPC, supra note 94.
98. R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1 SCR 295 at 344, 18 CCC (3d) 385. 
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Charter.99 As one court concluded, choosing to affirm or swear an oath on 
a holy book such as the Bible or the Quran leads to no reliable inferences 
about one’s religious beliefs.100 There is some rationale to this argument, as 
non-religious people may swear an oath and religious people may believe 
it is a sin to swear an oath.101 It is notable, however, that both courts failed 
to explain how affirming or swearing an oath would not speak to the high 
likelihood of the person holding a particular religious or non-religious 
belief.  
If requiring witnesses to swear an oath or affirmation constituted 
compelled religious expression, it is likely that any violation would readily 
be justified under section 1 of the Charter if the oath or affirmation was 
sworn outside the courtroom.102 There are many laudable effects that arise 
from the proposed procedure: it allows religious witnesses to be bound to 
tell the truth to the greatest extent; better ensures bias does not infiltrate 
the trial process; promotes multicultural values; and is more efficient 
than the current procedure. When weighed against the minimal religious 
expression required in swearing an oath or affirmation to the court clerk 
outside of public view, the oath and affirmation process ought to constitute 
a rational, minimally impairing, and proportional invasion of any religious 
expression implicit in swearing an oath or affirmation.103
Finally, it has proven difficult to convince a legislature to abolish the 
oath given the influence of religion in society. Proposals to abolish the oath 
are not new, extending back at least to the mid-nineteenth century.104 Yet, 
these proposals typically fail.105 Even in an increasingly secular society,106 
a recent proposal to abolish the oath in England was defeated in 2013.107 
The Magistrates’ Association agreed with religious leaders that the oath 
99. See Anderson,	supra note 102 at paras 38-39; Robinson,	MBPC,	supra note 102 at para 56.
100. See Robinson, MBPC, supra note 94 at paras 56-57. Similarly, see Anderson, supra note 94 at 
paras 38-39.
101. See Part I, above.
102. This was in fact the alternative conclusion come to in Anderson, supra note 94 at paras 60-66. 
103. See R	v	Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 26 DLR (4th) 200.
104. See White, supra note 6 at 427-430 and the numerous sources he cites therein.
105. In Canada, see Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report on Evidence, supra note 78 at 
36, 86-87; Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on the Law of Evidence (1976) at 113-131. 
In England, see the Criminal Law Revision Committee, Evidence (General), Report 11 (1972) at 
paras 274-281. In Scotland, see The Scottish Law Commission, Draft Evidence Code (First Part), 
Memorandum 8 (1968) at 66-70; The Scottish Law Commission, The Law of Evidence, Memorandum 
46 (1980) at paras 6.02–6.10. In New Zealand, see the Northern Territory Law Reform Committee, 
Report on The Oaths Act, Report 32 (2008) at 9-13. 
106. See Pew Research Centre, “Worldwide,” supra note 30.
107. See Robert Pigott, “Motion to End Bible Oaths in Court Defeated” BBC	News	(2013), online: 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-24588854> [https://perma.cc/WS3R-4PNZ].
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still served the function of strengthening the evidence of witnesses.108 
A recent law reform commission in Canada also rejected the proposed 
abolition of the oath for this reason.109 As a practical matter, then, it may be 
difficult to convince a legislature to abolish the oath due to political costs. 
Modifying the procedure for administering oaths and affirmations 
therefore presents a more palatable response. Fortunately, it is unlikely that 
effecting such a change would require a legislative amendment. Consider 
the wording of the most frequently invoked Canadian oath provision: 
section 13 of the Canada Evidence Act. It provides that “[e]very court and 
judge, and every person having, by law or consent of parties, authority 
to hear and receive evidence, has power to administer an oath to every 
witness who is legally called to give evidence before that court, judge or 
person.” The term “administer” only requires that the court be responsible 
for ensuring the oath or affirmation is undertaken. Nothing in the term 
implies that such a duty cannot be delegated to a court clerk so long as the 
judge confirms in court that either an oath or affirmation took place outside 
of the courtroom walls.
Two further objections to this proposal also merit comment.110 First, it 
may be retorted that it is central to the purpose of the oath and affirmation 
process that it be performed in a courtroom before the judge (and jury), the 
accused, lawyers, and gallery. This ceremony, the reasoning goes, enhances 
the witness’ commitment to tell the truth. Perhaps more importantly, it 
also permits the trier of fact to assess the witness’ demeanour when being 
sworn, a factor that they can take into account in assessing the witness’ 
credibility. By taking the administration of the oath and affirmation out of 
the courtroom, this opportunity is lost.
I am not convinced that the mere ceremony itself enhances the 
likelihood of a witness to tell the truth. Even if it has a minimal effect, 
it is important to recall that my procedure for administering oaths and 
affirmations requires that witnesses confirm that they swore an oath or 
affirmation in front of all parties in the courtroom. As for the lost potential to 
assess demeanour, it is unclear why demeanour is valuable when a witness 
first takes the witness stand. The witness’ words when swearing an oath 
or affirmation are unrelated to the merits of the trial. Moreover, nothing 
in my proposal prevents the judge, jury, and counsel from assessing the 
108. Ibid.
109. See Alberta Law Reform Institute, Oaths	and	Affirmations:	Final	Report	(2014), online (pdf): 
<https://www.alri.ualberta.ca/docs/FR_105.pdf> [https://perma.cc/YM7U-T8WY] at 16-17.
110. I thank an external reviewer for pointing out these two counter arguments.
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witness’ credibility during the critical component of the trial: the provision 
of testimony.
Second, and relatedly, it may be contended that administering oaths 
and affirmations outside of the courtroom violates the accused’s right to 
be present during the entire trial. As a result, the accused ought to have 
the right to be present outside the courtroom during the administration of 
the oath and affirmation process. This argument, however, again assumes 
that anything relevant with respect to trial fairness, such as opportunity to 
assess demeanour, occurs during the oath or affirmation process. Even if I 
am wrong and demeanour has some value at the oath or affirmation stage, 
the proposed law would likely be upheld under section 1 as the purpose of 
the law is to rid bias from the trial process. In my view, fulfilling such a 
pressing and substantial objective is proportionate to any de	minimis loss 
of the opportunity to assess the demeanour of witnesses while swearing an 
oath or affirmation. 
Conclusion
Several commentators have laudably attempted to rid the trial process of 
the potential for unnecessary bias arising from administering oaths and 
affirmations in the courtroom. Their proposals, however, are not optimal. 
Substituting a requirement that all witnesses promise to tell the truth 
would certainly rid the trial of any potential for bias. However, swearing 
an oath has long been thought to bind a witnesses’ conscience to a greater 
extent. Without affirmative evidence to the contrary, abandoning the oath 
requires discarding a valuable tool for truth-finding in the trial process. 
Requiring oath-swearing witnesses to invoke a non-specific reference to 
“God” would solve potential bias against different religions. It is also more 
respectful of religious diversity than abandoning the oath. This proposal, 
however, fails to protect against potential biases towards atheists and other 
witnesses who refuse to swear an oath. 
The benefits derived from preserving the current oath and affirmation 
procedure may nevertheless be maintained by modifying the way in which 
they are sworn. By requiring that all witnesses swear an oath or affirmation 
outside of the courtroom, the trial process would allow religious witnesses 
to bind their conscious to a greater extent thereby furthering the truth-
finding function of the trial. Swearing oaths and affirmations out of the 
view of the trier of fact also ensures that unnecessary bias does not infiltrate 
the trial process. Moreover, the external administration procedure is more 
efficient than the current procedure as it requires less participation from the 
more costly members of the judicial process: lawyers and judges. Given 
these benefits and the absence of any statutory impediment to adopting 
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an external procedure for administering oaths and affirmations, Canadian 
judges should adopt the external administration procedure on their own 
motion.  
